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than in that of private persons, natural or artificial. But that is not
the chief objection, in this class of cases. The owner of the property
is not bound to accept a right of action, and a possible lawsuit, n
lien of the price. He may well say, that he is not compellable to
exchange his property for a lawsuit against any the most responsible party. And a mere claim against the sovereignty is even
further from payment, than one against a party liable to be impleaded in the courts. And although this objection is not applicable to municipal corporations, yet even these are proverbially reluctant to meet promptly their legal obligations. We think, therefore, that upon principle the owner of property, so compulsorily
deprived of it, is fairly entitled to have the compensation ready
for his acceptance, at the very time he is deprived of it, or in exceptional cases, as soon as the damage or price can be ascertained,
and that in neither case is a mere right of action, however secured,
to be regarded as an equivalent. It is not desirable here to examine the cases upon this point, since they are very numerous, and
may all be found in the dissenting opinion 'of Mr. Justice DoE,
and in some of the elementary books, and nothing is clearer, than
that no satisfactory rule upon the subject is deducible upon any
adjustment of the preponderance of the decided cases. We have
done what we could in that way in our work on Railways, Vol. I.,
§ 73, pp. 296 et 8eq., entitled "The time compensation is to be
made."
I.F.R.
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DOVER v. ROBINSON ET AL.
The plea of sureties upon a collector's bond that it is not their deed, is well
maintained by proof that subsequently to its delivery and approval, and without
their knowledge or consent, but with the knowledge and consent of the selectmen
of the town having custody of the bond, the penal sum was changed by the principal from twenty-five hundred to twenty-five thousand dollars.
Such an alteration, so made, avoids the bond as to the sureties. It cannot be
deemed a spoliation by a stranger. The inhabitants of the town cannot maintain
suit against the sureties upon a bond thus vitiated. The deliberate intentional
permission of such an alteration, by their general financial agents, defeats their
right to recover upon such bond against those not cognisant of the alteration nor
taking any part therein, nor ratifying the same.
The town itself ratifies such permission by inserting in their writ a count upon
the bond in its altered condition. They cannot take the chance of reaping a
benefit therefrom without incurring at the same time a risk of loss.
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ON report. Debt upon the bond of Martin L. Robinson and
his sureties, for the faithful performance by him of the duties of
collector of taxes. The defence was that the penal sum was
altered after delivery by crasing the word "hundred" and
inserting " thousand,". without the knowledge or consent of the
If the action could be maintained against them the
sureties.
defendants were to be defaulted; otherwise, it was to be discontinued as to the sureties and judgment taken igainst Robinson
alone. The bonds given by the same parties for previous years
had been for $25,000, and it was thought by the selectmen, when
they approved it, that this was for the same sum. The selectmen
testified that they did riot assent to the change of the penalty,
which was made by Robinson, when it was handed him, merely to
call his attention to the mistake, and that the chairman of the
board said it 6ould not charge the sureties for more than the
original amount; while Robinson swore that the chairman told
him (as he was about to scratch out tlfe word "hundred" with his
knife) to write the "thousand" over the top, if he wrote it anywhere. He did so, simply making ink marks across the "hundred."
There were two counts in the declaration, the first upon a bond for
$25,000, and the second upon one of like date and obligation in
the penal sum of $2500.
The justice drawing the opinion accompanied it with the following memorandum, which is recited here as showing the precise
state of facts upon which the decision is based.
"My opinion in this case is predicated upon the following view
of the facts, which I believe is the only one that we can reasonably
take upon the testimony as reported.
I state it in advance, because I think, if any difference of opinion arises among members of the court, it will be upon the facts
and not upon the law, and therefore I think they had better be
discussed separately.
The bond in suit as originally executed, delivered and approved,
was in the penal sum of $2500, instead of $25,000, which was the
sum usually inserted in the collector's bond. In the fall of 1872,
more than two years after the bond was given, the selectmen discovered this fact, and thereupon agreed to call the attention of the
principal to it.
This was done by one of them in the presence of the other two,
and the bond was handed to the principal, who in the presence of
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all the selectmen, remarked that he could fix that, and forthwith
with a pen struck out the word "hundred," and wrote the word
"thousaud" over it. There was but little conversation. The testimony taken together seems to establish the fact that one of the
selectmen expressed the opinion that the change could not be made
so as to hold the sureties beyond the sum first inserted without
their consent, and that be directed the principal to write the word
"thousand" over the word "hundred," and that neither of the
other selectmen said anything, expressing neither assent nor
dissent. The bond was replaced upon the town files, and the
alteration did not come to the knowledge of the sureties until the
next spring. After it did come to their knowledge, two of them
took mortgages of the principal's property, conditioned to be void
if the principal saved them harmless "from all legal liability" on
this and two other bonds which they had signed as his sureties,
"it beiiig, however, expressly understood that this mortgage imposes no additional liabilities on said sureties."
The sureties have paid to the town upon the other bonds more
than the estimated value of the mortgaged property. Under
these circumstances, the only reasonable inference seems to be that
the alteration was made with the knowledge and consent of the
selectmen, and that there is no evidence of any knowledge of, or
consent to, such alteration on the part of the sureties at the time
it was made, or of any subsequent ratification thereof by them."
.A. Everett, for the plaintiffs, contended that the only power
given to the selectmen was to approve a sufficient bond. When
they had done this they were functus offio in this respect, and
could not authorize an alteration of one already taken and
approved. The bond ran to the inhabitants of the town, and the
selectmen were strangers to it, so that an alteration made by them
would not vitiate it; d fortiori, one made by the principal, without consent of the obligees, would not have that effect.
J. Crosby and A. M. -Robinson, for the defendants.
BARRows, J.-Upon the testimony here reported the question

seems to be whether the inhabitants of a town can maintain an
action against the sureties upon a collector's bond, originally given
in the penal sum of $2500, when said penal sum has been altered
by the principal in the bond, since its delivery, with the knowledge
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and consent of the selectmen of the town, frorn $2500 to $25,000,
without the knowledge of the sureties, and in the absence of all
proof of a subsequent ratification by them. The proposition that
these facts are sufficient to sustain the sureties' plea that such
altered bond is not their deed, would seem to admit of little doubt.
It is not a case of spoliation by a stranger. The cases which
ho1, as in Small v. Danville, 51 Maine 359, and Mitchell v.
1?oekbind, 52 Maine 118, that towns are not responsible for the
wrongful acts of their officers in the performance of a public duty
imposed upon them by statute, have no proper application to a
case like this.
It is no legitimate consequence of the doctrine of these and
similar decisions, to subject the debtors of a town to the increased
liabilities which might ensue from an undetected alteration of the
instruments which form the evidence of their indebtment, when
such alteration is made with the permission of the financial agents
of the town, and to hold that such tampering with written obligations entails no risk of loss when unsuccessfully attempted.
The
town seeks here to enforce a right by virtue, of a sealed instrument which.was never executed in its present condition by those
against whom they claim to recover on the strength of it.
The
change, which would avoid it beyond controversy or question, if
made with the consent of an individual obligee, was made by the
consent of those whom the town had made its custodians. The
plaintiffs claim to maintain their suit upon tle bond, notwithstanding its avoidance upon the ground that the alteration was an act
unauthorized by them, and one which their selectmen were not
empowered by law or vote of the town to permit.
To be relieved from a liability incurred through tne unauthorized and unlawful act of a public officer is one thing-to enforce
as a valid subsisting claim a bond which has been vitiated with the
consent of those who rightfully had it in keeping on behalf of the
town, is quite another. There seems to be no good reason why the
principles which are laid down in Qiadwick v. Bastman, 53
Maine 12, and Lee v. Starbird, 55 Maine 491, touching'the
alteration of written instruments offered in evidence, should not be
held to apply to a case like the present.
It is not a case of misappropriation of payments, like that of Porter v. Stanlek, 47
Maine 515, nor of negligence and mistake on the part of the
selectmen, like that of .Farmington v. Stanley, 60 Maine 472,
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*where the defendants were rightly held chargeable for the default
of their principal, although they might have been relieved if the
mistakes made by the town officers could have been allowed to
pass uncorrected.
A careful examination will show that there is little analogy between those cases and the one now before us.
To sustain the present suit against the sureties we have a written obligation which has been vitiated as an instrument of evidence by the deliberate intentional act of the plaintiff's agents,
an act done apparently to secure themselves from the blame which
might attach to them for their carelessness in accepting an inadequate security, but an act which as effectually deprived the town
for which they acted of any right of action against these sureties
upon this bond as if they had never executed any bond at all. It
is not their deed. But there is another view which is equally
fatal to the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff town presents itself
here in this very suit in the attitude of ratifying this act of their
selectmen.
Whatever might have been thought of the elaborate and ingenious effort of counsel to establish the position that the inhabitants
of the town ought not to be affected by what he claims to ha*e
been the unauthorized act of their agents, if they had brought
suit on the bond as originally given, it can hardly avail when we
find that the first count in the writ asserts the giving of a bond by
The plaintiff corporation
the defendants in the sum of $25,000.
seems to have been ready to avail itself of the alteration if it
passed unnoticed. They can do so, only at the hazard of losing
the benefit of their bond altogether. Asserting a claim here upon
the bond, in its altered condition, they must be held to have
ratified the act of their selectmen in permitting the alteration, and
to stand in the same position as a private corporation or an individual does in bringing suit upon an altered instrument.
That position is not improved by any acts or omissions on the
part of the sureties. They gave no implied authority to the principal and to the town officers to insert such sum as they might
agree upon, by executing the collector's bond in blank, as was
done in the case of South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Maine 89.
The condition of the mortgage of the principal's property
received by two of the sureties to secure them against all "legal
liabilities" upon this and two other bonds, is so framed as to
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exclude the idea that they intended to ratify the alteration. Even
if they had not already paid upon the other bonds a sum larger
than the estimated value of the mortgaged property, the reception
of this mortgage could not be construed as a ratification.
As to them the plea that this is not their deed is well maintained. Such a defence cannot avail the principal who made the
alteration. Plaintiffs have leave to discontinue as to the sureties.
The doctrine of the foregoing case
seems most unquestionable. Indeed, it
may fairly be said to be so far removed
from the debatable ground as not to involve any question which, upon the present state of the decisions, could properly be regarded as even doubtful.
The alteration seems to have been
material beyond all debate, raising the
penal sum tenfold. According to the
old rule of the English law, as laid down
by Lord COKE, in his commentary on
Pigott's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 27, if any
deed be altered in a point material by
the plaintiff himself, or by any stranger,
without the ptivity of the obligee, it
thereby becomes void. And the same
rule is maintained so late as Davidson
v. Cooper, 11 M. & W. 778 ; 13 Id. 343 ;
where Lord ADINGER, C. B., in giving
judgment, repeats the very words of
Lord COKE as being still law. But
the rule seems never to have obtained
to the same extent in this country. It
is required here, at present day, that the
alteration should be material, in order
to affect the validity of the instrument:
.Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192;
Langdon v. Paul, 20 Vt. 219 ; Waring

v. Smith, 2 Barb. Ch. 119 ; but in order
to avoid the contract,it must be made
by the privity of the party intended to
enforce the contract, and also with a
fraudulent purpose, and not by mere mistake or misapprehension: Adams v.
Frye, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 103. But here
there can be no question whatever upon
this point. For it is idle to discuss the
question whether a town, or any other
corporation, can enforce contracts in its
favor against sureties when the amount
has been raised by its own principal executive officers by arrangement with the
principal without the concurrence of
the sureties.
We understand the English courts to
have adopted of late much the same views
upon this question with our own courts
-that the alteration must be in some
material matter and with the privity of
the party in interest, and not by a mere
stranger, or by mistake and without
fraudulent purpose : Ilrschman v. Budd,
Law Rep. 8 Exch. 171. The rule that
alterations by a stranger will not affect
the contract, seems to be established in
the Irish courts: Swifey v. Barry, I
I. F. R.
Jones Ir. Exch.109.
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MARTHA D. RODERIGAS,
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A payment by a debtor to an administrator duly appointed is valid, and a bar
to a second action, although the supposed intestate is alive at the time and the
letters of administration are subsequently revoked for this reason.
Although Surrogate courts are of limited and special jurisdiction, which
depends upon the existence of certain facts, yet their decision upon the existence
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of such facts and their consequent jurisdiction is conclusive until regularly
reversed or vacated, and will protect all innocent parties acting on the. faith of it.

. IN October 1857, the intestate, James Divine, deposited with
the defendant, a savingi b:nk in the city of New York, the
sum of $185, and soon thereafter went to the island of Cuba,
vit4 his wife, the present plaintiff, to reside, leaving his wife's
mother, Isabella McNeil, residing in the city of New York.
Neither James Divine, nor his wife, having returned to New York
in April 1869, Irs. McNeil applied to the surrogate of New
York for letters of administration upon his estate, upon sufficient
formal proof that he had died intestate, leaving assets in the
county of New York, and that his wife was also dead, and that
she was a creditor; and in May, 1869, the surrogate granted
letters of administration to Mrs. McNeil upon his estate. The
proceedings resulting in the letters of administration complied
within the statutes upon the subject, and were all regular in form.
After letters were issued to her, she went to the savings bank,
produced her letters, and demanded and received the deposit
which had been made about twelve years before, with the accumulation of interest. In May 1872, the plaintiff returned from
Cuba to New York, and then for the first time learned what her
mother had done; and she applied to the surrogate for letters of
administration upon her husband's estate, upon allegations and
proof that he lived in Cuba until March 1871, when he died intestate, and the surrogate revoked the letters which had been
issued to Mrs. McNeil, and granted letters to the plaintiff, who
had again married. The plaintiff then demanded the deposit of
the defendant, with the accumulation of interest, and payment
In theacourt below
being refused, she brought this action.
plaintiff reetwered, whereupon defendant brought the case to this
court, where it was argued before six judges, and these being
equally divided, it was argued again before a full court
S. P. .Nash, for appellant.
S. Jones, for respondent.
The opinion of a majority of the court was delivered by
EARL, J.-The sole question for our consideration is whether
the payment to the first administratrix is a defence to this action.
It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff that the surrogate,
in granting letters upon the estate of her husband, who was not
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-then dead, acted wholly without jurisdiction, and that his
proceedings in granting such letters were null and void. The
question as to the effect of letters granted under such circumstances, has never, so far as I can discover, been decided in this
state, and is in this case for the first time before this court for
consideration.
Surrogate's courts are courts of limited and special jurisdiction, and yet their jurisdiction to grant administration upon the
estates of deceased persons is general and exclusive. No other
courts can act and discharge tile same functions. Before their
proceedings can have any validity or confer any authority, they
must have jurisdiction to act, and this is true of all courts.
No
court, no matter how general its jurisdiction may be, which
proceeds without jurisdiction in the particular case, can make a
valid record, or confer any rights. When a statute prescribes
that some fact must exist before jurisdiction can attach in any
court, such fact must exist before there can be jurisdiction, and
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction by erroneously deciding that
the fact exists, and that it has jurisdiction. But when general
jurisdiction is given to a court over any subject, and that jurisdiction depends in tile particular case upon facts which must be
brought before the court for its determination upon evidehee, and
when it is required to act upon such evidence, its decision upon the
question of its jurisdiction is conclusive until reversed, revoked
or vacated, so far as to protect its officers and all other innocent
persons, who act upon the faith of it: M-iller v. Brinkerhoff, 4
Denio 119 ; Staples v. Fairchild,3 N. Y. 41 ; People v. Sturtevant, 9 Id. 263; Skinnion v. Kelly, 18 Id. 356; Porter v.
Purdy, 29 Id. 106; Bumetead v. Read, 81 Barb. 661; Grgnon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. (U. S.) 319 ; Halonb v. Phelps, 16
Conn. 127; State v. Scott, 1 Bailey's Law R. 294; Raborg v.
Hammond, 2 Harris and Gill 42; Brittain v. Kinnaird, 1 Brod.
& Bing. 432.
This rule as to the jurisdiction of officers and
courts of limited and special jurisdiction has many illustrations
in the cases cited. In Staples v. Fairchild,the rule is announced
as follows : "Where certain facts are to be proved before a court
or officer of special and limited jurisdiction, as a ground for issuing process, and there is a total defect of evidence, the process
will be void; but where the proof has a legal tendency to make out
a proper case in all its parts for the jurisdiction of the court or
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officer, although such proof may be slight and inconclusive, the
process will be valid until set aside on a direct proceeding for that
purpose. In one case the court acts without authority; in the
other, it only errs in judgment upon a question properly before it
for adjudication. In one case there is a defect of jurisdiction ; in
the other, there is only an error of judgment."
In Porter v. Purdy, the following language is used: "When
in special proceedings in courts, or before officers of limited jurisdiction, they are required to ascertain a particular fact, or to
appoint persons to act in such proceedings, having particular
qualificati6ns, or occupying some particular relation to the parties
or the subject, such acts, when done, are in the nature of adjudications, which if erroneous, must be corrected by a direct
proceeding for the purpose; and if not so corrected, the subsequent- proceedings which rest upon them are not affected,
however erroneous such adjudications may be." In Grignon's
LEssee v. Astor, where by a law of Michigan, the county courts
had power under certain circumstances, to order the sale of the
real estate of a deceased person for the payment of debts and
legacies, it was held that it was for that court to decide upon the
existence of the facts which gave jurisdiction.
In JBrittain
v. Kinnaird,DALLAS, C. J., -said: "The magistrate, it is urged,
could not give himself jurisdiction by finding that to be a fact
which did not exist. But he was bound to inquire as to the fact,
and when he has inquired, his conviction is conclusive of it."
The jurisdiction of surrogate's courts is defined, and their
proceedings. are regulated in our statutes. It is provided (2 R. S.
74,sec. 23), that the "surrogate of each county shall have sole and
exclusive power within the county for which he may be appointed,
to grant letters of administration of the goods, chattels and credits
of persons dying intestate, in the following cases: 1. Where
an intestate, at or immediately previous to his death, was an
inhabitant of the county of such surrogate, in whatever place
such death may have happened. 2. Where an intestate, not
being an inhabitant of this state, shall die in the county of such
surrogate, leaving assets therein. 3, Where an intestate, not
being an inhabitant of this state, shall die out of the state, leaving assets in the county of such surrogate, and in no other
county. 4. Where an intestate, not being an inhabitant of this
state, shall die out of the state, not leaving assets therein, but
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assets of such intestate shall thereafter come into the county of
such surrogate." It is further provided (see. 26), that "before
any letters of administration shall be granted on the estate of
any person who shall have died intestate, the fact of such
person dying intestate shall be proved to the satisfaction of the
surrogate, who shall examine the persons applying for such letters
on oath, touching the time, place and manner of the death, and
whether or not the party dying left any will; and he may also.
in like manner examine any other person, and may compel such
person to attend as a witness for that purpose."
Under these provisions of the statute the surrogate can no more
institute a proceeding than the judge of any other court can institute a suit. lie must wait until some person interested comes
before him, and upon proper allegations invokes the exercise of
his jurisdiction, and then he has not the option to exercise it; lie
must exercise it. If he should refuse to act, he can be compelled
to action by mandamus. While the statute gives him no jurisdiction to administer upon the estate of a living person, it imposes
upon him the duty of inquiry as to the death of any person upon
whose estate letters of administration are applied for, and the
inquiry is a judicial inquiry. In discharging that duty he may
examine the person applying for letters, and examine otiher witnesses, and in making such examination he is discharging his
judicial functions, and exercising his rightful jurisdiction. He can
compel the attendance of witnesses before him by attachment, and
false swearing would be perjury under our statutes upon that
subject. When 'proof has been produced to his satisfaction, the
other conditions of the statute being complied with, he must issue
letters. The inquiry may be a difficult one. In many cases in
the time of war, in the case of absence upon the seas, or in foreign
lands, and in the case of long absence unheard from, death cannot
be proved with infallible certainty. Witnesses may be untruthful
or mistaken, and the surrogate may thus be led into error. Yet
he must act; the statute makes it his duty to do so. He must
decide upon the fact of death as best he can upon the evidence
produced, exercising a judgment not infallible. Does he decide at
his peril? If he decides one way, has he jurisdiction, and if he
decides the other, has he no jurisdiction, and has he had none?
The claim is, that if death has not occurred, although the surrogate may have been satisfied by the clearest proof before him
VOL. XXIV.-27
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that death had occurred, his proceedings are a nullity for want of
any jurisdiction to act The consequence is, that they furnish no
protection to any one. The surrogate who has in good faith
ordered the sale of property and the distribution of money, may
in after years be made liable for the whole estate. After many
years it may be a question whether the intestate died in one month
or in another month earlier or later, and shall the jurisdiction of
.the surrogate, and the validity of his proceedings, and his protection against liability, depend upon how this question may be determined by a jury upon disputed evidence? If the surrogate's proceedings are to be held null and void in case he errs as to the fact
of death, the same result must follow if he errs as to the place of
death, and as to the other facts mentioned in section 23, above
cited. The fact of inhabitancy is frequently one difficult to be
determined. It is one the surrogate must determine before he can
issue letters, and its determination frequently depends upon disputed and fallible evidence, and if error as to the fact of death will
leave him with no jurisdiction, so will error as to the fact of inhabitancy, and the consequence will be, that in such a case his proceedings will give no protection to any one. A construction of the
statutes which will lead to such results, will make the laws as to
the jurisdiction and proceedings of surrogates' courts difficult and
hazardous to execute, and should not be tolerated unless the language will admit of no other construction. I am of opinion, taking
into consideration the various provisions of the statutes, that it was
the intention of the legislature to confer upon surrogates' courts
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of granting letters
of administration, and as part of that j urisdiction to determine the
facts upon sufficient evidence upon which their action must rest.
As early as 1792 (2 Greenl. 420), in the preamble to an act con
cerning administrations, it is recited that "administrations had
been frequently granted in that state upon the mere suggestion of
the party applying for the same, without due proof of the death of
the person upon whose estate they were granted; and it had hap.
pened that administrations had been granted upon estates of persons who were then living and residing within this state, and administrations were frequently granted to persons in no wise related
to the intestate, and who procured administrations only with a view
of appropriating the estate of the intestate to their own use ; from
which practice great inconveniences were likely to ensue, for rem.
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edy whereof it was enacted ' that no letters of administration should
thereafter be granted by the judge of probates, or by any surrogate,
upon the estate, goods, chattels or credits of any person, represented as having died intestate, until due proof be made before the
said judge or surrogate, to his satisfaction, that such person was
dead, and died intestate.'" And substantially the same provision
has been continued in the statutes to this day. This provision has
made it the duty of the surrogate to institute a judicial inquiry
into the facts of death and intestacy. The statutes furnish a corn-.
plete system. The surrogate is to take judicial action, and determine the facts upon which his jurisdiction rests. If the case be a.
proper one, he must issue letters, and then the letters are conclusive evidence of the authority of the administrator, until reversed
on appeal or revoked: 2 R. S. 80, sect. 56. There is ample
power to revoke or vacate letters in case they have been improperly
granted, but in that case the acts of the administrator done in
good" faith are valid: 2 R. S. 80; sect. 47; Laws of 1837, ch.
460; Flinn v. Chase, 4 Denio 85; Kerr v. Kerr,41 N. Y. 472.
The administrator is required to give a bond that he will faith,
fully execute his trust, and obey all orders of the surrogate touching the administration. Taking all these provisions together, it is
apparent that it would be rare that a living person would be seriously harmed by administration upon his estate. But it is otherwise with persons who deal with those who are thus clothed as administrator with the conclusive evidence of authority. This defendant, when called upon by the first administrator, could not resist
payment, even if it had been practicable for it to ascertain that
Divine was then living, and whether he was dead or alive was an
issue which it would not have been permitted to litigate: Presser
v. Wagner, 87 E. C. L. R. 287, and note; Belden v. Meeker, 47
N. Y. 307; Parham v. Horan, 4 How. 717; Wins. on Exrs. 492.
As my conclusion in this case is based upon the construction of
the statutes of this state, regulating the jurisdiction and proceedings of surrogate courts, decisions from other states made under
statutes not the same can furnish us little aid. But the following
authorities tend somewhat to sustain the conclusion I have reached:
Bumstead v. Read, 31 Barb. C. C. 1; Bolton v. Brewster, 32 Id.
389; Aonell v. Dennison, 8 Abb. 401 ; Halcomb v. Phelps, 16
Corn. 127; 1aborg v. Hammond, 2 Har. & G. 42; Parham v.
Moran, supra.
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There is a dictum, adverse to my conclusion, in Allen.v. Dundas
8 Term Rep. 125; and also in Gritffih v. Frazier, 8 Cranch 9.
In Jochumsen v. Suffolk Saviags Bank, 3 Allen 87, the precise
question involved in this case, of the payment by the savings
bank to an administrator of a depositor, appointed in his lifetime,
was decided under the Massachusetts statutes, adversely to the
views I have expressed. It was held that the depositor could
recover, notwithstanding the prior payment by the bank to the
administrator. In Bolton v. Jacks, 6 Robt. 166, there is a learned
discussion of the question of the jurisdiction of courts, and it ivas
there held that if a surrogate admitted to probate a will of a testator, not at the time of his death an inhabitant of this country, he
acted without jurisdiction, and that his proceedings were void and
could be attached collaterally. I believe the decision to be unsound
in this respect. A further criticism of cases to which our attention has been called, would not be useful. The question for our "
decision is not free from doubt. A decision either way would be
confronted with some authority, and meet with some logical
difficulties.
'the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, costs
to abide event.
The decision in this case is probably
without a precedent, either in English
or American jurisprudence, and the argument of the learned judge on thequestion of policy, that as attempts to administer upon the estates of living persons
are likely to be rare, it is better such
persons, having been adjudged to be
dead, should be so treated, than that the
numerous acts of their quasi representatives should be held 4oid, might be apt
to remind dissenting readers of the memorable instance of the high priest, who
counselled that it was better for one innocent man to be put to death than that
the whole nation should be kept in uproar. And still, we cannot but see that
there is really nothing intrinsically absurd in the decision, when looked at
merely upon the principles involved in
it. It is only declaring probate courts
in the state of New York to be courts
of general jurisdiction and entitled to

the same conclusive presumptions in
favor of their jurisdiction, which we apply to the superior courts of a state or
nation, and to superior courts of record
of general jurisdiction. This presumption, within certain limits, would, no
doubt, prove salutary. There is no
very good reason why the jurisdiction
of courts of probate, so far as it depends
upon domicile within a particular district within the state, should be allowed
to be attacked collaterally and all the
proceedings rendered nugatory. But
the decisions to this extent are very numerous, and have never been questioned
to our knowledge: Outh v. Harkins, 9
Mlass. 543; 11Vales v. Willard, 2 Id. 120 ;
Holyoe v. Hark-ins, 9 Pick. 259 ; s. C.,
5 Id. 20; Ex parte Backer, 2 Leigh
719. And it has even been held that
the same consequences will follow where
a stranger is appointed administrator,
without it appearing that there was no
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next of kin who might have been appointed: Langworthy v. Baker, 23 Ill.
484. Some of the decisions professedly
going upon this view may have misapplied the principles, and all of them proceed upon grounds more or Jess techninical. But when the rule of tle conclusiveness of the records of probate courts
comes to be applied, not only to questions of jurisdiction, a class of cases
to which, to that extent, it never has
been before applied at all, but to be
extended also to a case, where no
court could possibly obtain jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, the very casus
belli, or contingency upon which the
jurisdiction attaches not having yet
transpired, we may, as it seems to us,
well demand some more compelling
reasons for the extension than any presented by the learned judge in the principal case.
There is probably no rule of law more
unquestionable than that courts of special and limited jurisdiction must set
forth upon theii" judgments all the facts
upon which the jurisdiction of the courts
depend, or such judgments will be absolutcly void, upon the very face of the
proceeding. The cases upon this point
are too numerous to be cited, and there
is no conflict among them. Many of
them, both English and American will
be found in the notes to Crepps v.
Durden, I Smith's Lead. Cas. 978 et seq.
And the rule is the same in regard to
courls of general jurisdiction, where the
want ofjurisdiction appears upon the face
of the record ; but the mere omission to
state, in the record of such courts, all the
facts constituting thejurisdiction, maybe
supplied by intendment or presumption,
which cannot be done in the case of
courts of special and limited jurisdiction : Peacock v. Bill, I Sauud. 73;
G(rignon v. Astor, 2 How. (U. S.) 319;
Huntington v. Charlotte, 15 Vt. 46;
ate v. Kimborough, 2 Dev. 431.
And there is another important dis-

tinction between courts of superior and
general jurisdiction and those whose
jurisdiction is special and limited, that
in tike latter case the jurisdiction may
be attacked and defeated in any collateral proceeding, by showing that,
although the court determined the facts
constituting its jurisdiction, duly set
them forth upon the proceedings, so as
to give primdfaciejurisdiction, yet this
was founded in error and mistake of the
court ; while as to the former class of
courts, the jurisdiction will not only be
presumed, in the absence of any recital
in the record of the facts necessary to
give jurisdiction, but this presumption
is one of the class of conclusive presumptions, presumptionesjuris et dejure,
so that no evidence can be received to
disprove it: Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johis.
121 ; Denning v. Corwin, 11 Wend. 647.
There is no end to the cases, all in
one direction, in favor of the above proposition. And even where superior
courts of general jurisdiction exercise a
special, limited, statutory power, the
same rule is applied to their proceedings
as to courts of special and limited juris-.
diction: Denning v. Corwin, supra,
Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill 76; Striker v.
Kelly, 7 Hill 11.
There may be some uncertainty in
separating these two classes of courts in
some cases, but there is no controversy,
we believe, or has been none hitherto,
that courts of probate, whose jurisdiction is created and defined by statute, for
the settlement of estates, within particular defined districts, must be regarded
both as inferior courts and of special
and limited jurisdiction, and that no
presumption could be made in favor of
their jurisdiction beyond what appeared
on the face of their proceedings, and
that, even where that appeared regular,
it might be contradicted in any collateral proceeding and the whole action of
the court rendered nugatory and void for
all purposes. But when we come to
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find allthis ignored and set aide by
one of the ablest courts in the country,
and the opposite views maintained and
applied to a state of facts where no court
could possibly obtain jurisdiction any
more than it could obtain jurisdiction of
- one who was never born, or had already
deceased, we must confess to a new sense
of the uncertainty of the lav.
We rejoice that there is still some
authority in the opposite direction in the
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, in the very able opinion of Mr. Justice DEWEY, in Jockumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 3 Allen
87, and in the declarations of other eminent jurists ; Chief Justice MARSHALL,
in Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch 9;
the court in Fisk v. Newell, 9 Texas 13,
and in every other case where the ques-

It seems to us a matter or some weight
that, under the English Statute of 1857,
20 & 21 Vict., chap. 77, by which a
court of probate of general jurisdiction,
throughout all England, and of the
same grfade as the superior courts in
Westminster Hall,was created, it should
still be regarded as a matter not open to
debate, that even an administration
granted by that court, of the goods or
probate of the will, of one still living,
is absolutely void, and its effect may be
defeated in any collateral proceeding by
oral proof. Mr. Horsey, the author of
a popular book on Probates and Administrations, p. 157, says : "Neither is a
probate conclusive evidence of the death
of the testator; and if he be living, the
probate is utterly void."
I. F. R.
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Where a partnership and the several members of the firm are insolvent, and
there are no partnership funds for distribution among its creditors, the creditors of
the firm are entitled to share equally with the creditors of each partner, in the
distribution of his individual assets, the amount so distributed to the creditors of
the firm, however, not to exceed the amount of their claims.
MOTION for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court of Madison county.
A. J. Brock and Marion Slaughter were partners dealing in

hogs and cattle, and the firm, as well as both partners, became
and are still insolvent. Each of the partners, and also the firm,
made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, the defendants in error being the assignees of Brock and also of the firm,

and E. G. Coffin being the assignee of Slaughter.
The assets of the firm amount to only $6.35, a sum insufficient
The assets of A. J.
to pay the costs of administering the trust.
the hands of hls
in
Brock amount to $27,241.18, and are
I
assignees ready for distribution ; and there is also a large amount
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of assets of Slaughter in the hands, or to come into the hands, of
his said assignee. There are numerous creditors of each of the
partners and also of the firm.
The original petition in this case was filed by the assignees of
Brock and of the firm against Brock, Slaughter, the creditors of
Brock, the creditors or the firm, and the assignee of Slaughter,
setting forth the facts aforesaid, and praying the court to make
such order as to marshalling and distributing the funds so in their
hands as equity and justice require.
The defendants waived the issuing and service of process, and
by their written agreement submitted the cause to the court
"upon the facts so stated in the petition, and without further
answer on their part." The cause was accordingly heard in the
Common Pleas upon the petition alone, and was taken by appeal
to the District Court, where the defendants made a motion for
leave to file an answer and cross-petition, controverting material
facts stated in the petition. This motion the court overruled, and
on the hearing rendered a decree to the effect that the creditors
of the firm should share equally with the individual creditors of
each member of the firm in the distribution of the individual
assets.
The individual creditors of Brock now ask leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court, alleging that the court erred in overruling their motion for leave to
file the answer and cross-petition, and also in adjudging that any
part of the individual assets should be distributed to the creditors
of the firm, until after the individual creditors should be paid in
full.
Winans, Darlington & Smith, with whom were also Wilson
.Durflinger,for the motion. '

.

George L neoln and .arrison & Mfarsh, contrA.
WELCH, J.-Motions for leave to amend or change the pleadings, in appealed cases in the District Court, are addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and its rulings thereon will not be
reversed on error, except where all the facts bearing upon the
motion are set forth, and where there has been a manifest abuse
of discretion. No such case is made here. For aught that appears there may have been good reasons for refusing the motion.
Apparently the granting of the motion would have necessitated
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a continuance of the cause, as it is not shown that any notice was
given the opposite party of an intention to make the motion, so as
to enable them to prepare for trial. No reason is assigned for the
motion, except the fact that the matters set up in the answer were
unknown to the defendants at the time of trial in the Common
Pleas. What other facts bearing upon the propriety of granting
the motion were shown by either party, does not appear.
Nor do we see any error in the decree rendered by- the court
upon the final hearing. The creditors of the firm trusted both
the partners, and had a valid claim against each for the full
amount of the partnership debts, wherea's the individual creditor
only trusted one of them. It would seem, on principles of
natural justice, therefore, that the assets ought to be so marshalled
in such cases as to give some preference to the partnership
The
creditors over those of the individual members of the firm.
It seems to us, howauthorities on the subject are not uniform.
ever, that the better authorities, both English and American, as
well as reason, establish the justice of the rule adopted by the
court below. In other words, equity will apply the assets of an
insolvent partnership in payment of the creditors of the firm, to
the exclusion of creditors of its individual members, and if there
be no partnership assets for distribution, as was the case here, the.
creditors of the firm have a right to share equally with the creditors of each individual member of the firm in the pro rata
Of course, the aggregate amount so
distribution of his assets.
distributed to the creditors of the firm must not, in any case,
It is true that this rule may
exceed the amount of their claims.
work hardship and apparent injustice in particular cases; so, it is
believed, will any general rule that can be devised. We understand it to be the rule established by the decision of this court in
Rogers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179. What should be the rule
where the partnership assets are insignificant, or where they will
yield to the creditors of the firm a less dividend than the creditors
of the individual members would realize from the individual assets,
and whether the creditors of the firm should, in such case, be
confined to the partnership assets, we are not called upon in the
Motion overruled.
present case to decide.
MOILVAINE, 0. J., WHITE, REX and GILMORE, JJ.,
The principles upon which assets consisting of partnership property and of

concurred.

separate property have been distributed
among creditors in cases of insolvency,
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bankruptcy, and administration are not
unirorm or clear. Itis probably safe to
say, that everywhere throughout the
common law countries (except formerly in Vermont, Reedy. Slhephardson,
2 Vt. 120), the joint estate (firm property) is reserved for the phyment of
the joint or firm creditors, and that the
separate creditors can only come upon
the urplus remaining after payment of
the joint debts.
The better opinion
seems to be, that this preference arises,
not from any superior merit in the joint
creditors, but from the nature of the
partnership relation.
A partner owns
nothing in the firm property except his
share of what may remain after payment rf the firm debts, and of his debts,
if any, to the firm ; so that his co-partners ltare an equity that the firm
property should not be taken for
payment of his separate debt, until it be
ascertained what the amount of his interest is. Therefore,- it is quite plain,
that in distributing joint estate among
the two clasies of creditors, the joint
creditors must ne patein rull, in order
that justice may be done between the
partners themselves, before any dividend
can be looked for by the separate
creditors. But what are the rights of
the joint creditors in the separate
estate, is a question of much greater
doubt. It has been held:
1. That they are to be excluded froi
ever-ything but the surplus of the
separate estate, just as the separate
creditors are from the joint estate.
2. That they are to be thus excluded,
unless there is no joint estate and no
living solvent partner (and in England,
also, where the petitioner against the
separate estate is a joint creditor, an
exception which will not be considered
in this note), when they may come in
upon the separate estate pro rata with
the separate creditors.
3. That after exhausting the joint
estate, they may come in for the balance
VOL. XXIV.-28

pro rata with the separate creditors,
upon the surplus of the separate estate
remaining after the latter have received
from it an equal dividend.
In McCullol Y. Dasliell, 2 Iarris &
Gill 106, the court applied the rule
which makes each estate pay its own
debts as a general principle of equity to
the administration of a deceased partner's assets. ARCHER, J., condemned
the exception in favor of joint .creditors,
when there is no joint estate and no
living solvent partner, as unequal, i. e.,
unreciprocal, and therefore, inequitable.
Inasmuch as there was a joint estate of
$35, the exception could not have applied, and need not have been considered. In Jarvis v. Brooks, 3 Foster
(N. H.) 136, and Crockett v. Crockett,
33 N. H. 542 ; Ganson v. Lathrop, 25
Barb.456; Wilder v. Ifeely, 3 Paige 172;
Payne v. Jfatthews, 6 Id. 19 ; Hall
v. Hall, 2 McCord Ch. 302; similar
views were entertained as to the reciprocal preference of the two classes
of creditors in their respective estates,
but nothing was said as to the exception in case of no joint property and
no living partner.
Lord Ch. HARCOURT first laid down
the rule we have just been discussing
inExparte Crowder, 2Vern. 706 (1715),
followed by Lord Ch. KiNG, in Ex
parts Cook, 2 P. Wins. 500, and by
Lord HARDWICKE in Exparte Hunter, I
Atk. 228.
In Bx parte layden, I Br.
Ch. 454, Lord TuURLOW introduced
the exception in favor of the joint
creditors, that where there is no joint
estate and no living solvent partner,
they may come in upon the separate
estate pro rata with the separate
creditors. But a joint estate, however
inconsiderable, if it be distributable. i.
e., not less than the expenses of distribution, nor pledged for more than its
value, will prevent the operation of this
exception. In Ex parle Peake, 2 Rose
54, the joint estate was l. lls. 6d.,
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and Lord ELDOx said five shillings
would be enough. In Ex parte Hodgson, 2 Br. Ch. R. 5 (1785), Lord
THURLow broke down the rule entirely,
and said there was I Ino distinction as
to joilat and separate debts, and said he
thought proper to declare, that debts,
whether sole or joint, ought to be paid
out of the bankrupt's estate, which is
composed of his separate estate and of
Lord
his moiety of the joint estate."
LOUGHUOROUGH re-established it in Ex
parte Elton, 3 Ves. Jr. 238 (1796),
and it has rnever since been departed
from. He explained Lord THURLOW'S
practice, as has often been attempted in
the cases since (Jarvis v. Brooks, 3
Foster 142; Murrell et al. v. Neill, 8
How. 414), as a rule of convenience,
subject to the limitation that the
assignee of the separate estate might at
any time, by a bill in equity, prevent
the joint creditors from receiving a
dividend from it until the separate
creditors had been paid in full. This
hardly consists with the language of
Lord THuRLOW, who evidently contemplated, not merely that the joint
creditors might prove their claims under
the separate commission, and receive a
dividend if there were no opposition,
but that they should receive it pro rata
with the separate creditors, whether the
latter were paid in full or not. Yet, on
the other hand, in Ex parte Flintum, 2
Br. Ch. 120, he cited Ex parte Crisp, 1
Atk. 133, as the case on which he
founded his opinion, the facts of which
do not seem to justify it. It was a
petition by a bankrupt, against whose
separate estate Lord HARDWICKE had
allowed a commission to issue, upon the
claim of a joint creditor to have the
All the joint
commission superseded.
creditors had been paid or secured in
full by the other partners, and the
Chancellor granted the prayer of the
petition, upon condition that within one
month the petitioner paid all the separate debts. There was, therefore, no

contest whatever between the two
classes of creditors. Ex parteElton is
the law of England to-day, as an
examination of the Bankruptcy Act of
1869, and Bankruptcy Rules of 1870
will show ksee also 2 Lindley on Part.,
p. 1201),and we shall speak of it hereafter as the English rule. It is followed
in Ladd v. Griswold, 4 Gilman (Ill.)
407, and
25; Palilman v. Grares, 26 Ill.
in Pennsylvania, in all cases of bankruptcy and insolvency. In McCarty v.
Emnlen, 2 Yeates 190 ; Snodgrass' Appeal, I Harris 471 ; Walker v. Eyth, I
Casey 216 ; Black's Appeal, .8 Wright
503 ; Heckman v. Messenger, 13 Wright
465; Frow's Estate, 23 P. F. Smith
465; Toombs v. Hill, 28 Geo. 371 ;
Smith v. Mallory, 24 Ala. 628 ; 1Aterrell etal. v. Neill, 8 How. 414, and in
Ohio, Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St.
179, and the principal case.
In Bank v. Keizer, 2 Duvall 169,
and Wtitehead v. Chadwell's Adm., Id.
432, a mean between Lord THURLOW'S view and the English rule was
adopted as the true equitable distribution. The court held, that while the
joint creditor should be allowed an exclusive priority in the joint estate, the
priority of the separate creditors in the
separate. estate should be reciprocal
only in amount, and that the surplus of
the separate estate, after they had received a dividend equal to that paid the
joint creditors from the joint estate,
should be divided pro rata between
both. rhese cases apply to all contests
between the two classes of creditors,
the rule which in Bell v. Newman, 5
S. & R. 78, was applied to administration alone.
In Bardwell v. Perry, 19 Vt. 292;
Newman v. Bailey, 16 Pick. 570;
Allen v. Wells, 22 Pick. 450 ; Tuckev. Oxley, 5 Cranch 41, and Camp v.
Grant, 21 Conn. 62, the view is taken
that the joint creditors may prove
against the separate estate, but that the
court, upon the familiar principles of
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marshalling assets, where one creditor
has two funds upon which he may
come, while the others have but one,
will compel them to exhaust the joint
before they receive any dividend from
the separate estate.
This principle, in one shape or
another, has been applied almost universally in cases of insolvency and
bankruptcy, but a further difference of
opinion is found in the books as to
whether it is as a rule of convenience
confined to those kinds of distribution,
or whether it is a general principle
of equity, and as such, applicable in
all disputes between joint and separate
creditors, especially in the administration of assets. Lord ELDON applied it
as such in a case of administration:
Gray v. Chiswell, 9 Ves. Jr. 123;and
it was so applied in Wilder v. Keeler,
Payne v. Matthews, Hall v. Hall,
.dfcCulloh v. Dasiell,Ladd v. Griswohl,
Paman v. Graves, Toombs v. Hill,
Smith v. fallory, supra, and in Woodrop v. Word, 3 Dessaussure 203. In
Ohio, the contrary was at first held :
Grosvenor v. Austin, 6 Ohio 103, which,
however, must be regarded as overruled by Rodgers v. 3feranda, supra.
Whether the English rule applies in
Pennsylvania to administration or not,
is involved in some doubt.
In McCarty v. Emlen, 2 Yeates 190,
the question arose whether a debt due a
partnership could be attached for the
private debt of one of the partners.
The court held that it could, and the
interest of the partner would be bound
thereby, and dismissed the English cases
cited, supra, saying that they only
applied in cases of bankruptcy and insolvency YEATE8, J., dissented. In
Bell v. Vewman, 5 S. & R. 78, the
administrator, defendant, had in his
hands separate property of the decedent and firm property not sufficient to pay the firm debts. Chief
Justice rILGI2'xAN held that the English rule was not a general principle

of equity, but a rulee of convenience
applied in bankruptcyland insolvency;
that the question being one of administration, was to he regulated by the
Act of April 19th 1794, which required
an equal distribution of a decedent's
assets, which would be attained by
allowing the joint creditors to exhaust
the joint fund, and to come in for the
balance upon the separate fund after
the separate creditors had received
from it an equal dividend.
DUNCAN, J., concurred, but went
further, and thought that the joint
creditors ought to have been allowed to
come in upon the separate estate pro
rata with the separate creditors. GIBsoN, J., dissented from both the positions taken by TILGHMAN, C. J., holding the English rule to be one of
general equity, applicable to all cases
of distribution among creditors, and
that the Act of 1794 only meant that
in cases of deficiency of assets, each
fund should be equally distributed
among its own peculiar class of cred.
itors.
In Sperry's Estate,-1 Ashmead 347,
although there was no occasion to
compare the English rule with that of
Bell v. Newman, because there being no
joint estate, and no living solvent
partner, the distribution would have
been the same under either; yet KING,
J., did maintain the lattervigorously.
In Black's Appeal, 8 Wright 503,
THOMPSOn, J., went out of his path in
an opposite spirit, the case being one of
insolvency, to condemn the rule laid
down in Bell v. Newman, in cases of administration, saying that the dissenting
opinion of GisoN, J., was the best argument that could be made against it, and
that the English rule was a general prin.
ciple ofequity. In IlfeCormick'sAppeal,
5 P. F. Smith 252, the administrator of
Hayes, a deceased partner, confessed a
fund in his hands of 83207.60, belonging to the separate estate of the decedent. Hayes, at his death, owed the
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firm of Hayes & MeCormiek $5585.45.
The debts amounted, after distribution
of the firm property, to$16,869.68. The
assignee of the firm claimed a dividend
from the separate estate upon one-half
of each of these sums. The court
awarded it only in one-half the former,
as being a separate debt due by one
partner to the firm. Thus the English
rule was applied to a case of administration, in clear departure from Bell v.
Newman, which was not cited in argument or in the opinion of the court.
AGNEW,
J., founds his opinion on
Black's Appeal, which was a case of
insolvency. "When Hayes died, the
law undertook the settlement of his
affairs. As the rights of creditors
then attached to h'is estate, when it
fell in gremium legis, so they must
remain.
His debts were two-fold
in kind, those he owed in common
with McCormick to their partnership creditors ; and those he owed to
his individual creditors.
He left also
two funds, his interest in the partnership effects, which were bound to the
payment of the partnership creditors
through the instrumentality of the sur-

viving partner, and his separate assets
bound to the payment of his individual
debts thr'ough his administrators. Eath
fund being insufficient, neither class can
receive anything from the opposite fund."
A similar departure from Bell Y. Newman seems to have been made by the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia in .3cKen.
na'sEstate, lWeekly Notes 517, reported
also in 32 Legal Int. In the clause:
" We think the auditor rightly postponed the'claims of the co-partners ;"
we presume the word co-partners is
intended for co-partnership creditors.
We wish that in both these cases,
especially in the first, that it had been
distinctly stated whether it was the
intention to overrule Bell v .Ncwman.
The closing remarks of the court in
the principal case, declining to consider
what distribution should be made when
there was a joint estate distributable,
but trifling, or even where the joint
creditors should receive from their
estate a smaller dividend than the
separate did from theirs, show that
much tossing upon this painful question
may be still expected in Ohio.
H. G. W.

Supreme Court of -llinois.
EPHRAIM INGALS v. CECILIA B. PLAMONDON

ET AL.

Land which is covered by a party-wall remains the several property of the
owner of each half, but the title of each is qualified by the easement of the other
of support of his building by means of the portion of the wall belonging to his
neighbor.
The easement of support is the only proper one attached to a party-wall,
and does not include a right to the unobstructed use of a flue by one of the parties
which is on the land of the other.
The common law rule is that where the owner of two heritages, or of one consisting of several parts, arranged and adapted them so that one derives a benefit
from the other of an obvious and continuous character, and then conveyed one of
them without mentioning such incidental advantage or burden of the one in
respect to the other, there is an implied agreement that such advantage and burden
shall continue as before the separation of the estate.
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In order to affect a purchaser of property with notice of an easement in favor
of an adjoining owner, the same must be continuous and apparent.
The owner of a fifty-foot lot divided the same into two equal parts by an east
and west line, and built a dwelling-house on the north part, and placed the south
wall thereof so that half of it stood on each lot, and also made an eight-inch projection on the south side of the wall resting on the south lot, containing a flue
which was specially adapted' and used for carrying off smoke from a furnace permanently built in the house. The owner conveyed the north half of the fifty-foot
lot -to the centre of the south wall, with the house, to complainant, and subsequently sold the south half of the fifty-foot lot to defeidant. Held, That the easement being obvious and apparent to any observer, the purchaser of the south lot
was chargeable with notice, and would be enjoined from interfering with the flue.

BILL for an injunction to restrain appellees from closing up or
interfering with a flie in the party-wall between the residence of
appellant and one in process of erection by appellees. In the year
1868, John Crighton owned fifty feet of ground, upon the corner
of Throop and Monroe streets, in Chicago, which was divided into
two twenty-five feet lots, and during that year he built upon the
north lot a three-story and basement brick house. The south wall
was designed as a party-wall, and was so placed that its centre
coincides with the division line between the lots, half of the wall
being upon one lot and half upon the other. The 6all is twelve
inches thick, and upon the south side, or side adjoining the vacant
lot, there is a projection eight inches thick, caused by the chimney
flue. This is the flue appellees threaten to obstruct. It furnishes
a smoke escape and draft for the furnace used in warming appellant's house, was built and used for that purpose by Crighton, the
original owner of both lots, and the builder of the house during the
winter of 1868-9, and until his conveyance of the property to appellant. It has also been used by appellant in the same manner
since the conveyance to him.
On February 5th 1869, Crighton entered into an agreement in
writing with appellant for the sale and conveyance to him of the
north lot, which agreement, after providing for a conveyance on
May 1st 1869, which should include the brick house and all appurtenances thereon, contained this provision: "And vhereas said
Crighton owns the premises next south and adjoining the premises
above described, and the south wall of said house, being a party
wall, one-half thereof standing upon said lot or parcel of land next
south and adjoining; now, in consideration as aforesaid, the said
Crighton further covenants and agrees with said Ingals that at the
time of the execution of said deed aforesaid, he will also execute a
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proper party-wall agreement with said Ingals, to run with the land
in case the adjoining owner shall use the same, therein agreeing to
pay for one-half of the cost of party-wall when the ground next
south of the above described premises shall be improved, the value
of said wall to be estimated at the time said land shall be improved
and said wall used. The agreement was signed and sealed by both
the parties. The purchase price was $24,000. On May 1st 1869,
according to the contract, Crighton made his deed of the north lot
to appellant, it being an ordinary warranty deed, conveying the
premises, "together with the brick house and barn, and other improvements thereon situate, * * * together with all and singular
the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging, or in
any wise appertaining."
On the second day of May 1869, the parties entered into an
agreement in writing, under their hands and seals, which after
reciting their several ownerships of the lots, the improvements on
appellant's lot, and that Crighton's was unimproved, contined as
follows: "And whereas the centre of the south wall of the house
so standing on the ground of said Ingals is directly over the line
between the grounds of said Ingals and Crighton, one-half thereof
standing upon the grounds of said Crighton, though said wall is
entirely and bsolutely owned by said Ingals; now in consideration of one dollar, and other good and valuable considerations
moving from Ingals to Crighton, the receipt of which is acknowledged, the said Crighton covenants with said Ingals that so soon
as the south twenty-five feet of the north fifty feet of said lot five
is used or improved in such a way that any structure thereon is
connected with said party-wall, he will pay to said Ingals one-half
of the cost to build such a wall at the time such portion of said lot
is used as aforesaid, and for the consideration aforesaid, Crighton
agrees to and with said Ingals to pay for such portion of the barn
or other of said Ingals' improvements now projecting upon the land
of said Crighton.
"All agreements herein shall be construed as covenants, and shall
run with the land and be obligatory upon the heirs, assigns and
personal representatives of the respective parties hereto. And it
is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that this agreement shall be construed in conformity with the law and usage
touching party-walls." This agreement was duly recorded in the
recorder's office of Cok county, May 10th 1869.
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The south lot continued to be the property of Crighton, and
remained unimproved until some time in 1873, when Crighton sold
and conveyed the same to the appellee, Cecilia B. Plamondon, wife
of Ambrose Plamondon, who soon after her purchase began to
improve the lot by the erection of a dwelling-house thereon. An
estimate of the amount to be paid by her to appellant, as half the
cost of the wall under the agreement, was made and agreed to by
the parties, and a receipt therefor in writing given by appellant,
releasing Mrs. Plamondon from all claim for compensation for the
wall to be used by her in the erection of her dwelling-house, and
concluding as follows: "This release, however, not to prejudice or
affect in any way any rights of the undersigned except for compensation as aforesaid to which he may be or become entitled under
said agreement." (Stat. of May 2d 1869.)
On January 12th 1874, Mrs. Plamondon gave appellant notice
in writing that as in the proper construction of her house it might
be necessary or desirable for her to close up the flues which Were:
wholly within the part of the wall for which she had paid appel-

lant, she should proceed to do so whenever her house should have,
progressed so that such action should seem proper. Thereupon
this bill for an injunction was filed. A temporary injunction was.
allowed, which was afterwards, on motion of appellees diss6lved by
the court, and upon final hearing on pleadings and proofs, the
court entered a decree dismissing the bill, and the appellants took
this appeal from the decree.
Frank J. Crauford, for appellant.
Gardner

u
for appellees.
Clyler,

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
SHELDON, J.-It appears from the evidence, the furnace in
appellant's house which is used for the beating thereof, was set up
and used by Crighton, its builder, and the original owner of both
the lots, as it is now erected, that it is not movable or -portable,
but is cQnstructed so as to be permanent, being enclosed by a brick
wall connected with the floor and basement wall. That the flue in
question was especially planned and adapted for a smoke escape
and draft for the furnace, that there are besides a kitchen and
laundry flue in the house, but that neither one of these can be
adapted or used for the furnace, that no other flue could be con.tructed for the use of the furnace without greatly injuring the
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house and involving material changes in its plan and arrangement.
There is, it is true, the contradictory testimony of Crighton, that
the smoke pipe attached to the furnace might be connected with
either of the other flues, and that they would either be sufficient to
provide a proper draft for the furnace, and that the change could
be made at an expense not to exceed $100; but the testimony of
practical architects who had made a personal examination of the
premises, including the one who made the plans and designs of the
dwelling and superintended its erection, is to the effect as first
above stated, and their testimony must be taken as more competent and satisfactory upon the point than that of Crighton. The
closing of the flue then would appear to have the effect to render
the furnace useless. Under such circumstances, the flue as it now
is and ever has been, must be regarded as reasonably necessary to
the beneficial enjoyment of appellant's house. The location of the
flue, or at least the greater portion of it, is in the south half of the
south wall of the house. The land upon which this south half of
the wall rests, the appellee, Mrs. Plamondon, owns by conveyance
of it to her from Crighton. This south wall, under the writings in
evidence, must be regarded as a partition wall between appellant
and Mrs. Plamondon, it having been paid for as such by her.
Land covered by a party-wall, remains the several property of the
owner of each half, but the title of each owner is qualified by the
easement to which the other is entitled of supporting his building
by means of the half of the wall belonging t6 his neighbor: Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601; Brooks v. Curtis, 50 Id. 639;
Tendricks v. Stark, 37 Id. 106. The only proper easement
attached to a party-wall is the easement of support. This would
give no right to the unobstructed use of the flue by appellant.
The conveyance from Crighton to appellant of the north lot, contains no express grant of such a right. Was it acquired by
implied grant under that conveyance? 'The rule of the common
law upon the subject is that where the owner of two heritages or
of one heritage, consisting of several parts, has arranged and
adapted these so that one derives a benefit or advantage from the
other of a continuous and obvious character, and he sells one of
them without making mention of those incidental advantages or
burdens of one in respect to the other, there is in the silence of
the parties an implied understanding and agreement that these
advantages and burdens, respectively, shall continue as before the
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separation of the title; Washb. Easements 58 ; Horrisonv. King,
62 Ill. 30; Larnyman v. .Milks, 21 N. Y. 505; Jone8 v. Jenkins,
11 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 24, s. a. 34 Md. 1. It may be noted
that the deed here from Crighton to Ingals specifically conveyed
the house, as well as the north lot.
Were the question between Crighton and Ingals, the equity of
the.latter to restrain Crighton's interruption of the use of the flue
by Ingals, circumstanced as the flue is with respect to the beneficial enjoyment of the house, would be plain.
In order that an easement should pass in the manner as above
named, by implication under the grant of an estate, it must be one
that is apparent, as well as necessary and continuous. We regard
the easement here claimed by appellant of the uninterrupted use
of this flue as continuous and necessary to the beneficial enjoyment
of his house, and the only serious question with us, as to the claim
of this easement against the grantee of Crighton of the south lot,
Mrs. Plamondon, is whether the easement was an apparent one at
the time of her purchase. There is no evidence in the record that
at the time she bad any actual notice or knowledge that any flue
in the party-wall was being, or bad been used by appellant for any
purpose. To affect her the easement must have been obvious and
apparent to any observer. An apparent sign of servitude must
have existed on the part of the premises she purchased in favor of
those of appellant, or as expressed by some of the authorities, the
marks of the burden must have been open and visible; Butter-

worth v. Grawford, 46 N. Y. 349; Washb. Easements 60; 88.
At the time of Mrs. Plamondon's purchase the entire south side
of the south wall of appellant's house stood exposed to view, the
projection forming the flue stood out from the wall proper, some
eight inches, with the chimney thereon, and rested visibly on the
land she purchased. We are of opinion that the easement claimed
in the use of this flue by appellant was indicated by the condition
of the premises, that it was obvious and apparent to any observer,
that there were apparent signs of the servitude, and that the marks
of the burden were open and visible, so as to satisfy the requirements of the authorities in such respect. It is admitted that the
projection -in the wall indicated there was a flue there, but it is
said that as it was on the south side of the wall it might have been
taken as an indication that it was put there for the benefit of the
building, which might afterward be erectqd and joined on the wall;
VOL. XXIV.-29
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but We think such would be a forced inference, that the reasonable
conclusion should be that the flue was constructed for the use of
the building of which it constituted a part, and that the wall was
to be used and enjoyed by the adjoining proprietors as a partywall, in the condition which it was then in so far as respected this
flue. The decree dismissing the bill will be reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Decree reversed.
Where a right or privilege is claimed thereon by the use of the flue. That
as being annexed to one's land to use there should be any doubt in the mind
the adjacent property of another for a of the court as to whether the easement
special purpose,whether arising by grant claimed was of such obvious character
as to satisfy fully the authorities in that
or reservation express or implied, or by
prescription, the existence of the alleged respect, might be a matter of remark,
in view of the apparently unqualified
easement or servitude will, in general,
depend. upon an affirmative answer to approval which the same court, in the
the inquiry, is it apparent, continuous recent well-considered case of M[orrison
and necessary ? In the principal case, v. King, 62 Ill. 30, gave to Pyer v.
Carter, I Hurl. & Nor. 916, and several
the only serious question with the court
was whether the easement claimed in kindred leading cases, both English
the flue was apparent, there being no and American, if, indeed, the court in
evidence before the court that, at the that case really intended to adopt Pyer
In
time of the purchase of the ground on v. C'alter without qualification.
which stood the portion or projection of some of the cases approved by the court
the party-wall containing the flue, the in Morrison v. King, the " marks" or
purchaser, against whom the easement "signs of servitude" were less open
'was claimed, had any actual notice or and visible than were those in the prinknowledge that any flue in the party- cipal case; yet Mr. Justice MCALLISwall was being or had been used for TER, in delivering the opinion, says
that "these cases" (including Pyer v.
any purpose.
There is considerable conflict in the Carter) * * * "1embody a current of auadjudged cases as to what are suffi- thority, holding that an easement may
cient marks or signs to charge those be created by the disposition made of the
dealing with the premises with notice premises by the owner of the estate, and
of the existence of an easement or ser- that, upon a severance of the title, the
vitude. The conclusion arrived at by then owners will take their respective
the court, in the foregoing case, that the shares as thieu existed in the hands of the
projection in the wall, surmounted by a fortner owner."1
Pyer v. Carter was the case of a drnin
chimney-top, furnished sufficient signs
of the servitude, is in harmony with the constructed under two houses by the
weight of authority. The marks of the owner thereof, it taking the water from
burden were sufficiently open and visi- both, and the owner afterwards conble for the purchaser of the servient veyed the houses to separate purchasers.
tenement to have ascertained readily, It was not proven that the purchaser of
by reasonable inspection of the premises, the servient tenement, at the time of his
at the time of her purchase, the exist- purchase, knew of the position of the
ence and extent of the burden charged drain, but it was held "that he must
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have known, or ought to have known,
that some drainage there existed; and
if he had inquired, he would have
known of this drain.'" It will be observed that the purchaser of the servient
heritage not only had no notice or
knowledge of the existence of the drain,
except what he was presumed to have
from his ordinary experience in regard
to the flow of water and the necessity of
drainage in towns; also, that there were
no visible signs of the drain; but his
presumed experience or observation in
relation to drainage in general must put
him upon inspection of the premises he
was about to deal with, to ascertain
whether or not there was a drain in use
connected with it and the adjoining
tenement; he was bound to make inquiry. It is a reasonable inference
from the report of the case, that there
were no apparent signs of the drain, in
the sense employed in the principal case.
If, therefore, Pler v. Carter is sound
law on this point, "apparent signs of
servitude" are not only those indications which are obvious to the natural
eye upon a casual examination of the
premises and surroundings, but the
same may mean simply such facts as
should be presumed to exist by a mind
of ordinary experience in respect to
privileges usually appurtenant to similarly-occupied premises, to which ex.perience a party dealing with premises
must recur, as the basis of an inquiry,
whether or not the same is subject to
some incident not openly visible, but
accessorial to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the adjacent land by its
owner. If that case is intended to go as
far as, by the language employed in the
decision it seems to go,. its authority in
this respect has been justly questioned,
and it is doubtful whether the court, in
31orrison v. King, supra, meant to
adopt, unqualifiedly, the doctrine of
Pyer v. Carter, so far as to hold that
any other signs of a servitude are suffi-

cient to charge a purchaser with notice
thereof than such as are "obvious and
apparent to any observer."
In Butterworth v. Crawzford, 46 N. Y.
349, which the court in the principal
case has referred to with approval, the
leading authorities were cited quite fully
in argument by counsel for the parties.
RAPALLO, J., in deciding thecase, says :
"In the case of Pyerv. Carter,1 Hurl.
& Nor. 916,which was much relied upon
on the argument, and in the opinion of
the learned court below, the dominant
and servient tenement had been originally one house. This house had been
divided into two parts. The drainage
was of the water which fell upon the
roof, and it may well be, that the situaz
tion and arrangement of the building
were such as to indicate that some drain
necessarily existed as an appurtenant to
the house, and that, upon the division
of the house into two parts, tiat drain
became common, and afforded drainage
for both of the parts through one of
them. * * * In Washburn on Easements (2d ed., p. 68), the learned author, after reviewing the eases on this
subject, states that he considers the doc"
trine of Pyer v. Carter confined to cases
where a drain is necessary to both houses;
and the owner makes a common drain
for both; and this arrangement is apparent and obvious to an observer. If
Pyer v. Carter goes further than that,
or, at all events, if it applies to cases
where there is no apparent mark or sign
of the drain, it is not in accordance
with the current of the authorities."
There are other cases decided by
learned courts which disapprove of Pyer
Carter, such as Dodd v. Burchell, I ff.
& C. 113; Suffield v. Brown, 10 Juris.
N. S. I ll; and Randall v. McLauqhlin, 10 Allen 366, &c. Some of the
dissenting cases-especially those in
Massachusetts-principally dissent from
so much of the decision in Pyer v. Carter
as held that, "the amount to be ex-
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pended in the alteration of the drainage,
or in constructing a new system of
drainage, is not to be taken into consideraticn, for the meaning of the word
'necessity I is to be understood the necessity at the time of the conveyance,
and as matters then stood,without alteration." But the Supreme Court of Illinois adhered to and adopted the same
rule in Morrison v. King, saying that
the position assumed by counsel "that
whatever of the alleged easement she
(Mrs. King) could restore or supply by
reasonable labor or expense, she was
bound to supply or do without, is supported neither by principle or authority," thus rejecting the authority of
the Massachusetts cases announcing a
different rule.
In the American Law Register for
January 1865 (Vol. IV., N. S., p. 134),
may be found an able and interesting
criticism by Judge REDFIELD of Pyer
v. Carter, and his estimate of its value
as authority, particularly on the points
thereof dissented from by the Lord
Chancellor in Su.ffleld v. Brown.
The element of actual apparentness is
by the best-accepted authorities prominently kept in view in determining the
existence and extent of au alleged easement; thus in Jones v. Jenkins, 11 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 24; s. c., 34 Aid. i,
ALVEY, J., says: " Whenever an owner
has created and .annexed peculiar qualities and incidents to different parts of his
estate (and it matters not whether it be
done by himself or his tenant by his
authority), so that one portion of his
land becomes visibly dependent upon
another for the supply or escape of
water, or the supply of light and air, or
for means of access, or for beneficial use
or occupation, and he grants the part to
which such incidents are annexed, those
incidents thus plainly attached to the
part granted, and to which another part
is made servient, will pass to the grantee as accessorial to the beneficial use

and enjoyment of the land." In Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505,.the Court
of Appeals decided that, where the
owner of land has by any artificial arrangement created an advantage for
one portion to the burdening of the
other, upon a severance of the ownership, the holders of the two portions
take them respectively charged with
the servitude, and entitled to the benefit openly and visibly attached at the
time of conveyance of the portion
first granted. See also Washburn on
Easements and Servitudes, ch. I, 3,
and Kenyon v. Nichols, 1 R. I. 412;
Phillips v. Phillips,48 Penna. St. 178 ;
Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407;
Cleris v. Tieman, 15 Id. 316 ; Robeson
v. Maxwell, 2 N. J. Eq. 57.
The court in the principal case does
not hold that the easement in the flue
was necessarily such because it happened
to exist as constructed, in the wall which
upon the severance of the estate became
a party-wall between the two owners,
as the only proper easement attached to
a party-wall as such is that of support.
This is sustained by Brooks v. Curtis, 50
N. Y. 639 ; Hendricks v. Stark, 37 Id.
106; and Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 Id.
601, cited by the court. The right to
use the wall as a party-wall was not involved. That had been determined by
the express contract between the parties. But other privileges may exist by
reason of artificial arrangements in some
way pertaining to a wall used as a
party-wall, which do not arise out uf its
use strictly as a party-wall ; thus a right
of way, or the means for the supply or
escape of air or water through a wall,
or the right to fasten clothes-lines or to
nail trees to a wall, or to use another's
chimney for the conveyance of smoke:
Goddard on Easements 55; Hervey v.
Smith, 22 Beav. 299.
As the growth of cities and towns in
this country is rapid and unparalleled,
so the law of casements and servitudes,
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more and more, year by year, affects directly the conflicting rights of vast
numbers of the people. Every new adjudication.which determines autloritatively some unsettled point in the law

becomes therefore of interest, not only
to the litigant parties, but also to the.
profession and the people at large.
FRa.Lc J. CB±WrO2D.

SUpreme Court of New Jerseyj.
MARTIN v. THE FRANKLIN FIRE INSURANCE CO.
On a policy of insurance against loss by fire, under seal, issued to the owner of
the property, in which the insurer covenants to make good unto the insured, his
executors, administrators or assigns, all such damage or loss as might happen,:
&c., the owner may sue in his own name, although it may be written on the face
of the policy: " Loss, if any, payable to A. B., as mortgagee."
The direction on the policy to pay to the mortgagee is not an assignment of the
policy. Its legal effect is that of a direction in advance as to the mode of payment, which, when made, is performance in the manner agreed to by the insured.
Under such a direction, if assented to by the insurer, the person in whose favor
the appointment is made acquires equitable rights, which the insurer is bound to
regard; but the contract with the insured is not thereby merged or extinguished.
In an action on such a policy in the name of the insured, if the insurer has paid
the iusurance-money to the mortgagee, he may plead such payment as performanee, and the rights of the mortgagee can be protected, and the insurer obtain
indemnity against a subsequent suit by the mortgagee by the payment of the money
into court.

DEMURRER to declaration. The action was brought on a policy
of
insurance
against loss
by fire,City.
issued The
by the
defendants
to seal
the
plaintiff,
on premises
in Jersey
policy
was under

and is dated April 27th 1870.
of the same year.
Kingman, for the demurrer.
J. B. Vredenburgh, contra.

The loss occurred in September

The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The ground of demurrer is that the action was improperly brought in the plaintiff's name. To sustain thd demurrer
the defendants rely on an averment in the declaration, that "on
the 30th day of May 1870, by a certain memorandum written on
the face of said policy of insurance, and subscribed by the said
defendants, it was agreed as follows, to wit: "Loss, if any, payable to Garret G. Vreeland, as mortgagee." On this averment the
contention is that the action is maintainable only in the name of
Vreeland.
DEPUE,
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In Hillyard v. The 3Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 6 Yroom 415,
this court held, that where a person takes a policy on his life, payable at his death to a third person, if it be in the form of a simple
contract, action may be brought on it by the party having the
beneficial interest. This case was affirmed on error: 8 Vroom 444.
Indeed, it may be stated, as- a general rule, that on a life-policy,
where the money to become due under it is payable to certain
persons named as beneficiaries, the policy and money payable
thereunder belong, the moment it is issued, to the persons designated, and they are the proper parties to receipt for the money,
and sue on the policy. The legal representatives of the insured
have no claim upon the money, and cannot maintain an action
therefor, if it be expressed to be for the benefit of some one else :
Bliss on Life Ins., § 317. This rule is founded on the fact that a
life-policy is a wager-policy: it is a mere contract to pay the
stipulated sum on the death of a named individual, in consideration of the payment of the premiums reserved during his life. An
interest in the life insured is not necessary to give validity to the
contract: Trenton Mutual Life v. Johnson, 4 Zab. 576; Dalby v.
India, ft., Co., 15 C. B. 365. The rights and obligations of the
parties, therefore, are determined by the form of the contract.
If by the terms of the policy the money is payable to a third
person, such person has the sole and exclusive interest in the insurance.
A contract of insurance against loss by fire is a different thing.
It is a contract of indemnity, which requires an insurable interest
in the property to give it validity. The owner, who obtains the
insurance, pays the premium and takes a policy in his own name,
is the party insured, although in case of a loss, payment is to be
made to a third person: Sanford v. The Mechanics' Ins. Co., 12
Cush. 541. If the person to whom the loss is made payable be a
mortgagee, the contract, nevertheless, is with the owner for the
insurance of his property, and not with the mortgagee for the
insurance of his interest: Grosvenorv. The Atlantic Ins. Co., 17
N. Y. 391: Bidwell v. The N. W. Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 179. To
treat the policy of insurance under such circumstances as a
contract exclusively with the mortgagee, would lead to results in
plain violation of the intention of the parties. On such a contract
the measure of liability is the payment of the mortgage-money,
and on payment thereof the insurer will be remitted to the mort-
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gagee's lien on the mortgaged premises for indemnity: Insurance
Oo. v. Woodruff, 2 Dutcher 542.
In the present case, in the body of the policy the defendants
expressly covenant, in consideration of the premium paid, to make
good and satisfy unto the insured, his executors, administrators or
assigns, all such damage or loss as might. happen to the property
insured, within the period for which the policy was issued. This
is the contract between the parties. The direction to pay ti-)
sum in which the in.urance was effected to the mortgagee, in case
of a loss, is collateral to the principal contract, and is not an
assignment of the policy. The legal effect of such a clause, in
favor of a third person in a policy in terms between the insurer
and the owner, is that of a direction in advance as to the mode of
payment, which when made is performance of the contract in the
maniler assented to by the insured, and discharges the obligation
pro tanto. This view of the nature of a clause of this kind in a
policy is expressed by SHAW, C. J., in Fogg v. Middlesex Ins. Co.,
10 Cush. 346; by BIGEnow, J., in Hale v. Mechanics' 1ns. Co., 6
Gtay 172; by DEWEY, J., in Loring v. The Manufacturers' Ins.
Co., 8 Gray 29; and by AMEs, J., in Turner v. Quincy Ins. Co.,
109 Mass. 573.
Under such a direction, if assented to by the insurer, the
person in whose. favor the appointment is made, acquires 'equitable rights which the insurer is bound to regard, but the contract
with the insured is not thereby merged or extinguibhed. If the
appointment be in favor of a mortgagee it will not operate pro
tanto as an extinguishment of the mortgage-debt. The mortgagee
may be content with the security of the remaining property included in his mortgage, or with his remedy on the bond. The
interest of the owner in the property and in having the mortgagedebt satisfied remains, notwithstanding the direction in the policy
to pay the insurance money to the mortgagee in case of a loss.
The interest so remaining in the owner is an insurable interest, for
the protection of which he may resort to his contract with the
insurer.
It has accordingly been held, that on a policy in which the insurer "caused C. & L. for the owners, payable to C. & L." to be
insured, an action might be maintained in tile name of the owners
with the consent of C. & L. (Fairow v. The Commonwealth Ins.
Co., 18 Pick. 58), and that the owner who insures his property by
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a policy payable to a mortgagee, in case of loss, might .maintain
an action on the policy in his own name by the consent of the
mortgagee, and that such consent may be shown at the trial or
even before judgment entered: Jackson v. Farmer Ins. Co., 5
Gray 52 ; Turner v. Quincy Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 568.
In my judgment, a broader principle even may be adopted than
was recognised in these cases, and the rule be affirmed on sound
legal principles, that an action may be maintained in the name of
the party with whom the contract was made, with or without the
consent of the person in whose favor the appointment is made, in
all cases where an insurable interest remains in such party. In
Davis v. Boardman, 12 Mass. 80, the policy stated that the
plaintiff D., "or his agent," made insurance, &c., it appearing that
the insurance was made for the benefit of,the plaintiff, and another
joint-owner, and he was allowed to recover the whole loss in his
own name-for the use of himself and the other joint-owner. In
Ward v. Wood, 13 Mass. 539, the declaration alleged that the
policy was made to the plaintiff, as well for C. S. as himself, in
certain proportions. It was objected that C. S. should have
joined in the action; and was held by the Court, that "it was in
conformity with the contract that the plaintiff should maintain
the action in his own name," and that the action was well brought
without joining C. S.
In Rider v. Ocean Ins. Co., 20 Pick. 259, the policy on a vessel
was issued to the plaintiff, for whom it might concern, loss payable
to a third person who was mortgagee; the property was the property *ofthe plaintiff and two others. An action in the name of
the plaintiff was held to be correctly brought, the Court saying
that "the suit would have been properly commenced in his own
name, even if he had never been interestd in the vessel; but in
such case he should have averred and proved for whose atcount
the policy was made, and in whom the interest at the time of the
loss really was." In Ketcham v. Protection -Ins. Co., cited in
Digest of Insurance Cases, 1 Allen (N. Bruns.) 136, the insurers
consented, by an endorsement on the policy, that the loss should
be payable to W., and it was held that such endorsement did not
preclude the assured from maintaining an action in his own name.
In a mutual company, on a policy "Loss payable to," &c., the
action must be brought in the name of the party to the policy who
gives the premium note, and thereby becomes a member of the
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company: Nevins v. Rockingham Ins. Co., 5 Foster (N. H.) 22,
"
Tolson v. Belknap County Ins. o., 10 Id. 231.
I am aware that there are dicta and cases to the contrary effect,
but they will be found, in the main, to be cases where the insured
had parted with his insurable interest, or made a regular assignment
of the policy, which had been ratified by the insurer, under its
charter or by-laws, or the question has been as to the right of the
person to whom the insurance money is appointed to be paid, to
sue in his own name.
Where the party with whom the contract of insurance is expressly made, has still an insurable interest to be protected by the
policy, and has not assigned it by a legal assignment, it is consistent with settled legal principles, to give him a right of action
on the policy in his own name. In such an action, if the insurance
money be wholly.unpaid, the recovery will be for the entire interest
in the policy, without regard to the mortgage. No injury will result
from such a procedure to any of the parties concerned. If the insurer
has paid the money to the mortgagee, he may plead the payment
as performance.
The breach assigned in the declaration that the defendant "has
not paid or made good the plaintiff's losg or any part.thereof,
either to the plaintiff or to the said Garret Vreeland," tenders
such an issue. The rights of the mortgagee can also be protected
by payment of the money into court, and the insurer may obtain
indemnity against any subsequent suit by the mortgagee, by the
action of the court into which the money is paid. If actions be
pending at the same time by the owner and the mortgagee, the
court, under its equitable powers, can so control the litigation that
no injustice will be done,
The demurrer should
be overruled.

Supreme Court of the United States.
MARIE A. N. POLLARD v. JACOB LYON.
In the absence of any statute making fornication indictable, words imputing
sexual intercourse to a woman are not actionable in themselves, unle-ss she is
married, and a declaration which does not aver that she is married, fails to set
forth any cause of action.
The averment that thereby the plaintiff was " damaged and injured in her name
and fame" is not a sufficient averment of special damage.
To support an action of slander the words must be: 1. Words falsely spoken
VOL. XXIV.-30
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of a person, which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offence
involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge is trde, may be
indicted and punished. 2. Words falsely spoken of a person, which impute thnt
the party is infected with some contagious disease, where, if the charge is true, it
would exclude the party from society. 3. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a
person, which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or
employment of profit, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties
of such an office or employment. 4. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party,
which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade. 5. Defamatory
words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable,
occasion the party special damage.
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Slander. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.-Words, both false and slanderous, it is alleged,
were spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff, and she sues in an
action on the case for slander, to recover damages for the injury
to her name and fame.
Controversies of the kind,-in their legal aspect, require pretty
careful examination, and in view of that consideration it is deemed
proper to give the entire declaration exhibited in the transcript,
which is as follows: "That the defendant, on a day named,
speaking of the plaintiff, falsely and maliciously said, spoke,
and published of the plaintiff the words following: 'Isaw her in
bed with Captain Denty.' That at another time, to wit, on the
same day, the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff the words followinig: 'I looked over the
transom-light and saw Mrs. Pollard,' meaning the plaintiff, 'in
bed with Captain Denty,' whereby the plaintiff has been damaged
and injured in her name and :fame, and she claims damages
therefor :in the 'sum 6f tOR ihousand dollars."
Whether the plai tiff and Captain Denty are married or single
persons does not appear;j lior is it alleged.tbat they are not husband
and wife, nor in what respect the plaintiff has suffered loss beyond
what may be inferred from the general averment that she had been
damaged and injured in her name and fame.
Service was made and the defendant appeared and pleaded the
general issue, which being joined, the parties went to trial and the
jury, under the instructions of the court, found a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff for the whole amount claimed in the declaration.
None of the other proceedings in the case, at the special term,
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require any notice, "except to say that the defendant filed a motion
in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the words set forth in
the declaration are not actionable, and because the declardtion does
not state a cause of action which entitles the plaintiff to recover,
and the record shows that the court ordered that the motion be
heard at general term in the first instance. Both parties appeared at the general term and were fully heard, and the court sustained the motion in arrest of judgment, and decided that the
declaration was bad in substance. Judgment was subsequently
rendered for the defendant and the plaintiff sued out the present
writ of error.
Definitions of slander will afford very little aid, in disposing of
any question involved in this record, or in any other, ordinarily
arising in such a controversy, unless where it becomes necessary
to define the difference between oral and written defamation, or to
prescribe a criterion to determine, in cases where special damage
is claimed, whether the pecuniary injury alleged, naturally flows
from the speaking of the words set forth in the declaration. Different definitions of slander are given by different commentators
upon the subject, but it will be sufficient to say that oral slander,
as a cause of action, may be divided into five classes, as follows:
1. Words falsely spoken of a person, which impute to the party
the commission of some criminal offence involving moral turpitude,
for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted andi
punished. 2. Words falsely spoken of a person, which impute
that the party is infected with some contagious disease, where, if
the' charge is true, it would exclude the party from society. 3.
Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which impute to the
party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment
of profit, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties
of such an office or employment. 4. Defamatory words falsely
spoken of a party, which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade. 5. Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person,
which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the party
special damage.
Two propositions are submitted by the plaintiff to show that the
court below erred in sustaining the motion in arrest of judgment,
and in deciding that the declaration is bad in substance: 1. That the
words set forth in the declaration are in themselves actionable and
consequently that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, without aver-
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ring or proving special damage. 2. That if the words set forth
are not actionable per se, still the plaintiff is entitled to recover
under the second paragraph of the declaration, which, as she insists,
contains a sufficient allegation that the words spoken of her by the
defendant were, in a pecuniary sense, injurious to her, and that
they did operate to her special damage.
Certain words, all admit, are in themselves actionable, because
the natural consequence of what they impute to the party is
damage, as if they import a charge that the party has been guilty
of a criminal offence involving moral turpitude, or that the party
is infected with a contagious distemper, or if they are prejudicial,
in a pecuniary sense, to a person in office or to a person engaged
as a livelihood in a profession or trade, but in all other cases the
party who brings an action for words must show the damage he or
she has suffered by the false speaking of the other party.
Where the words are intrinsically actionable, the inference or
presumption of law is that the false speaking occasions loss to the
plaintiff, and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to aver that the
words alleged amount to the charging of the described offence, for
their actionable quality is a question of law and not of fact, and
will be collected by the court from the words alleged and proved,
if they warrant such a conclusion.
Unless the words alleged impute the offence of adultery, it can
hardly be contended that they impute any criminal offence, for
which the party may be indicted and punished in this district, and
the court is of the opinion that the words do not impute such an
offence, for the reason that the declaration does not allege that
either the plaintiff or Captain Denty was married at the time the
words were spoken. Support to that view is derived from what
was shown at the argument, that fornication as well as adultery
was defined as an offence by the provincial statute of the 3d of
June 1715, by which it was enacted that persons guilty of those
offences, if convicted, should be fined and punished as therein provided: Kilty's Laws, ch. 27, secs. 1, 2.
Beyond all doubt offences of the kind involve moral turpitude,
but the second section of the act, which defined the offence of
fornication, was, on the 8th of March 1785, repealed by the
legislature of the state: 2 Id., ch. 47, sec. 4.
Sufficient is remarked to show that the old law of the province,
defining such an offence, was repealed by the law of. the state
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years before the territory, included within the limits of the city,
was ceded by the state to the United States, and inasmuch as the
court is not referred to any later law passed by the state; defining
such an offence, nor to any act of Congress to that effect, passed
since the cession, our conclusion is that the plaintiff fails to show
that the words alleged impute any criminal offence to the plaintiff
for which she can be indicted and punished.
Suppose that is so, still the plaintiff contends that the words
alleged, even though they do not impute any criminal offence to
the plaintiff, are nevertheless actionable in themselves, because the
misconduct which they do impute is derogatory to her character
and highly injurious to her social standing.
Actionable words are doubtless such as naturally imply damage
to the party, but it must be borne in mind that there is a marked
distinction between slander and libel, and that many things are
actionable when written or printed and published, which would not
be actionable if merely spoken, without averring and proving
e Clurg v.
special damage: Clement v. Chivis," 9 B. & C.174;
Ross, 5 Binney 219.
Unwritten words, by all or nearly all the modern authorities,
even if they impute immoral conduct to the party, are not actionable in themselves, unless the misconduct imputed amounts to a
criminal offence, for which the party may be indicted and punished.
Judges as well as commentators in early times experienced much
difficulty in extracting any uniform definite rule from the old
decisions in the courts of the parent country, to guide the inquirer
in such an investigation; nor is it strange that such attempts have
been attended with so little success, as it is manifest that the
incongruities are quite material, and in some respects, irreconcilable. Nor are the decisions of the courts of that country, even of
a later period, entirely free from that difficulty.
Examples both numerous and striking, are found in the reported
decisions of the period last referred to, of which only a few ivill be
mentioned. Words, which of themselves are actionable, said Lord
HOLT, must either endanger the party's life or subject him to infamous punishment; that it is not enough that the party may be
fined and imprisoned, for a party may be fined and imprisoned for
a common trespass, and none will hold that to say one has committed a trespass will bear an action; and he added that at least
the thing charged must "in itself be scandalous." Ogden v. Turner, 6 Modern 104.
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Viewed in any proper light it is plain that the judge who gave
the opinion in that case meant to decide that words, in order that
they may be actionable in themselves, must impute to the party a
criminal offence affecting the social standing of the party, for which
the party may be indicted and punished.
Somewhat different phraseology is employed by the court in the
next case to which reference will be made: Onslow v. Home, 3
Wilson 186. In that case DE GREY, C. J., said the first rule to
determine whether words spoken are actionable is, that the words
must contain an express imputation of some crime liable to punishment, some capital offence or other infamous crime or misdemeanor,
and that the charge must be precise. Either the words themselvis,
said Lord KENY N, must be such as can only be understood in a
criminal sense, or it must be shown by a colloquium in the introductory part, that they have that meaning, otherwise they are not
actionable: Holt v. Slolefield, 6 Term 694.
Separate opinions were given by the members of the court in
that case. and Mr. Justice LAWRENCE said that the words must
contain an express imputation of some crime liable to punishment,
some capital offence or other infamous crime or misdemeanor, and
he denied that the meaning of words not actionable in themselves,
can be extended by an innuendo: 4 Co. 17 b.
Prior to that Lord MANSFIELD and his associates held that words
imputing a crime are actionable, although the words describe the
crime in vulgar language and not in technical terms, but the case
does not contain an intimation that words which do not impute a
crime, however expressed, can ever be made actionable by a colloquium or innuendo: Colman v. Godwin, 3 Doug. 90; Woolnoth
v. Meadows, 5 East 463.
Incongruities, at least in the forms of expression, are observable
in the cases referred to, when compared with each other, and when
those cases, with others not cited, came to be discussed and applied
in the courts of the states, the uncertainty as to the correct rule
of decision, was greatly augmented. Suffice it to say that it was
during the period of such uncertainty as to the rule of decision,
when a controversy bearing a strong analogy to the case before the
court, was presented for decision to the Supreme Court of the state
of New York, composed, at that period, of some of the ablest jurists
who ever adorned that bench.
Allusion is made, in the opinion given by Judge SPENCER, to
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the great "uncertainty in the law upon the subject," and having
also adverted to the necessity that a rule should be adopted to
remove that difficulty, he proceeds in the name of the court to say
"in case the charge, if true, will subject the party charged to an
indictment for a crime, involving moral turpitude, or subject the
party to an infamous punishment, then the words will be in themselves actionable," and that. rule has ever since been followed in
that state and has been very extensively adopted in the courts of
other states: .Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 190 ; 1 Am. Lead. Cas.
(5th ed.) 98.
When he delivered the judgment in that case he was an associate
justice of the court, Chancellor KENT being the chief justice, and
participating in the decision. Fourteen years later, after he became
chief justice of the court, he had occasion to give his reasons for
the conclusion then expressed, somewhat more fully: Van Ness v.
Hamilton, 19 Johns. 367.
On that occasion he remarked, in the outset, that there exists a
decided distinction between words spoken and written slander, and
proceeded to say in respect to words spoken that the words must
either have produced a temporal loss to the plaintiff by reason of
special damage sustained from their being spoken, or they must
convey a charge of some act criminal in itself and indictable, as
such, and subjecting the party to an infamous pu,,ishment, or they
must impute some indictable offence involving moral turpitude;
and in our judgment the rule applicable in such a case is there
stated with sufficient fulness and with great clearness and entire
accuracy.
Controverted cases, involving the same question, in great numbers, besides the one last cited, have been determined in that state
by applying the same rule, which, upon the fullest consideration,
was adopted in the leading case, that in case the charge, if true,
will subject the party charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject the party to an infamous punishment, then the words will be in themselves actionable.
Attempt was made by counsel in the case of lridrig v. Oyer, 13
Johns. 124, to induce the court to modify the rule by changing the
word or into and, but the court refused to adopt the suggestion, and
repeated and followed the rule in another case reported in the same
volume: Martin v. Stillwell, 13 Johns. 275; see also aibb v.
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-Dewey, 5 Cowen 503; Alexander v. Same, 9 Wend. 141; Young

v. 1iller, 3 Hill 22; in all of which the same rule is applied.
Other cases equally in point are also to be found in the reported
decisions of the courts of that state, of which one or two more
only will be referred to: Bissell v. Cornell, 24 Wend. 354. In
that case the words charged were fully proved, and the defendant
moved for a non-suit, upon the ground that the words were not in
themselves actionable, but the circuit judge overruled the motion
and the defendant excepted. Both parties were subsequently
heard in the Supreme Court of the state, NELSON, C. J., giving
the opinion of the court, in which it *as held that the words were
actionable, and the reason assigned for the conclusion is that the
words impute an indictable offence involving moral turpitude.

Defamatory words, to be actionable per se, say that court, must
impute a crime involving moral turpitude punishable by indictment. It is not enough that they impute immorality or moral
dereliction merely, but the offence charged must be also indictable.
At one time, said the judge delivering: the opinion, it was supposed that the charge should be such as, if true, would subject the
party charged to an infamous punishment, but the Supreme Court
of the state refused so to hold: Widrig v. -Oyer, 18 Johns. 124;
Wright v. Page, 8 Keyes 582.
Subject to a few exceptions it may be stated that the courts of
other states have adopted substantially the same rule, and that
most of the exceptional decisions are founded upon local statutes
defining fornication as a crime, or providing that words imputing
incontinence to an unmarried female, shall be construed to impute
to the party actionable misconduct.
Without the averment and proof of special damage, says SHAW,
C. J., the plaintiff, in an action on the case for slander, must prove
that the defendant uttered language the effect of which was to
charge the plaintiff with some crime or offence punishable by law:
.Dunnell v. RsThke., 11 Met. 552. '

Speaking of actions of the kind, PARKER, C. J., said that words
imputing crime to the party against whom they are spoken, which,
if true, would expose him to disgraceful punishment, or imputing
to him some foul and loathsome disease, which would expose him
to the loss of his social pleasures, are actionable, without any
special damage. While words perhaps equally offensive to the
individual, of whom they are spoken, but which impute only some
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defect of moral chaiacter, are not actionable, unless a special
damage is averred, or unless they are referred, by what is called a
colloquium, to some office, business, or trust which would probably
be injuriously affected by the truth of such imputations: Chaddock
v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 252.Special reference is made to the case of Miller v. Parrish,8
Pick. 385, as authority to support the views 9f the plaintiff, but
the court here is of the opinion that it has no such tendency.
What the court in'that case decided is, that whenever an offence is
imputed which, if proved, may subject the party to punishment,
though not ignominious, but which brings disgrace upon the party
falsely accused, such an accusation is actionable, which is not
different in principle from the rule laid down in the leading casethat if the charge be such that, if true, it will subject the party
falsely accused to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, then the words will be in themselves actionable.
Early in her history the legislature of that state defined the
act of fornication as a criminal offence, punishable by a fine, and
which may be prosecuted by indictment, and if the person convicted does not pay the fine, he or she may be committed to the
common jail or to the house of correction. None of the counts in
that case contained an averment of special damage, but the court
held that inasmuch as the words alleged imputed a criminal offence
which subjected the party to punishment involving disgrace, the
words were actionable, and it is not doubted that the decision is
correct. Exactly the same question was decided by the same
court in the same way twenty-five years later: Kenney v. Laughlin, WGray 5; 1 Stats. Mass. 1786, 293.
That the words uttered import the commission of an offence, say
the court, cannot be doubted. It is the charge of a crime punishable by law and of a character to degrade and disgrace the plaintiff and exclude her from society. Though the imputation of
crime, said BIGELOW, J., is a test, whether the words spoken do
amount to legal slander, yet it does not take away their actionable
quality if they are so used as to indicate that the party has sufferred the penalty of the law and is no longer exposed to the
danger of punishment: Krebs v. Oliver, 12 Gray 242; Powler v.
Dowdney, 2 M. & Rob. 119.
Courts affix to words alleged as slanderous their ordinary meaning, consequently, says SHAW, C. J., when words are set forth as
VOL. XXIV.-31
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having been spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff, the first
question is whether they impute a charge of felony or other
infamous crime, punishable by law. If they do, an innuendo
undertaking to state the same, in other words, is useless and superfluous, and if they do not, an innuendo cannot aid the averment,
as it is , clear rule of law that an innuendo cannot introduce a
meaning to the words broader than that which the words naturally
bear, unless connected with proper introductory averments: Alexander v. Angle, I Crompt. & Jervis 143; Goldstein v. Foss, 2
Younge & Jervis 146; Carter v. Andrews, 16 Pick. 5 ; Beardsley v. Tappan, 2 Blatch. 588.
Other state courts, where the act of fornication is defined by
statute as an indictable offence, have made similar decisions, but
such decisions do not affect any question involved in this investigation: Tranderlip v. Roe, 23 Penna. St. 82; 1 Am. Lead. Cus.
(5th (d.) 103; Simons v. Carter, 82 N. Il. 459.
Much discussion of the cases decided in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania is quite unnecessary, as we have the authority of
that court for saying that the leading cases establish "the principle that words spoken of a private person are only actionable
when they contain a plain imputation, not merely of some indictable offence, but one of an infamous character or subject to an
infamous or disgraceful punishment, and that an innuendo cannot
alter, enlarge or extend their natural and obvious meaning, but
only explain something already sufficiently averred, or make a
more explicit application of that which might otherwise be considered ambiguous to the material subject-matter properly on the
record, by the way of averment or cglloquium: Goslinq v. Morgan, 32 Penna. St. 275; S'hafter v. Kinster, 1 Binney 537; MeClurg v. Ross, 5 Binney 218; Andres v. Koppenheafer, 3 S. &
R. 255.
State courts have, in many instances, decided that words are in
themselves actionable whenever a criminal offence is charged,
,vhieli, if proved, may subject the party to punishment, though not
ignominious, and which brings disgrace upon the complaining
party; but most courts agree that no words are actionable per 8e
unless they impute to the party some criminal offence, which may
be visited by punishment, either of an infamous character or which
is calculated to affect the party injuriously, in his or her social
standing: Buck v. Hersey, 31 Me. 558; H3fills v. Winp, 10 B.
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Monr. 417; _Perdue v. Burnett, Minor 138; Demarest v. Haring,
6 Cow. 76; Townsend on Slander, sec. 154; 1 Wendell's Starkie
on Slander 43; Bedway v. Gray, 31 Vt. 297.
Formulas differing in phraseology have been prescribed by different courts, but the annotators of the American Leading Cases
say that the Supreme Court of the State df New York, in the case
of Brooker v. Coffin, appear "1to have reached the true principle
applicable to the subject, and we are inclined to concur in that
conclusion, it being understood that words falsely spoken of
another, may be actionable per se when they impute to the party
a criminhl offence for which the party may be indicted and
punished, even though the offence is not technically denominated
infamous, if the charge involves moral turpitude, and is such as will
affect injuriously the social standing of the party: 1 Am. Lead.
Cas. (5th ed.) 98.
Decided support to that conclusion is derived from the English
decisions upon the same subject, especially from those of modern
date, many of which have been very satisfactorily collated by.a
very able text writer: Addison on Torts, 3d ed. 765. Slander,
in writing or in print, says the commentator, has always been
considered in our law a graver and more serious wrong and injury
than slander by word of the mouth, inasmuch as it is accompanied
by greater coolness and deliberation, indicates greater malice, and
and is in general propagated wider and further than oral slander.
Written slander is punishable in certain cases, both criminally and
ty action, when the mere speaking of the words would not be
punishable in either way: ,i7lers v. .foualey, 2 Wils. 403; Saville v. eJardine, 2 H. BI. 532; Bac. Abr. Slander, B.; Kedler v.
,Sesford, 2 Cr. C. C. 190.
'Examples of the kind are given by the learned commentator,
and he states that verbal reflections upon the chastity of an unmarried female are not actionable, unless they have prevented her
from marrying or have been accompanied by special damage; but
if they are published in a newspaper, they are at once actionable,
and substantial'damages are recoverable: Bl. Com. 125 n. 6; Janson v. Stuart, 1 Term 784.
Comments are made in respect to verbal slander under several
heads, one of which is entitled defamatory words not actionable
without special damage, and the commentator proceeds to remark
that mere vituperation and abuse by word of.mouth, however gross,
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is not actionable unless it is spoken of a professional man or tradesman in the conduct of his profession or business. Instances of a
very striking character are given, every one of which is supported
by the authority of an adjudged case: Lumby v. Allday, 1 Crompt.
& Jer. 801; Barnett v. Allen, 3 I. & N. 876.
Even the judges holding the highest judicial stations in that
country have felt constrained to decide that to say of a married
female that she was a liar, an infamous wretch, and that she had
been all-but seduced by a notorious libertine, was not actionable
without averring and proving special damage: Lynch v. Knight,
9 I. of L. Cas. 594.
Finally, the same commentator states that words imputing to a
single woman that she gets.her living by imposture and prostitution, and that she is a swindler, are not actionable, even when
special damage is alleged, unless it is proved, and the proposition
is fully sustained by the cases cited in its support: Welby v. Elstov,
8 M., G. & S. 142; Addison on Torts, 3d ed. 788; Townsend on
Slander, sec. 172, and note, 516, 517, 518.
Words actionable in themselves without proof of special damage,
are next considered by the same commentator. His principal
proposition under that head is that words imputing an indictable
offence are actionable per se, without proof of any special damage,
giving as a reason for the rule that they render the accused person
liable to the pains and penalties of the criminal law. Beyond
question the authorities cited by the author support the proposition
and show that such is the rule of decision in all the courts of that
country having jurisdiction in such cases: Heming v. Power, 10
Mees. & Wels. 570; Alfred v. Parlow, 8 Q. B. 854; .Ed-sall v.
Bussell, 5 Scott N. R. 801; Brayne v. Cooper, 5 Mees. & Wels.
250; Barnet v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 378; Davies v. Solomon, 41

Law Jour. Q. B. 11; Roberts v. Roberts, 5 Best & Smith 389;
Perkins v. Scott, 1 H. & C. 158.
Examined in the light of these suggestions and the authorities
cited in their support, it is clear that the proposition of the plaintiff,
that the words alleged are in themselves actionable, cannot be
sustained.
Concede all that, and still the plaintiff suggests that she alleges,
in the second paragraph of her declaration, that she "has been
damaged and injured in her name and fame," and she contends
that that averment is sufficient, in connection- with the words
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charged, to entitlb her to recover as in an action of slander for
defamatory words with averment of special damage.
Special damage is a term which denotes a claim for the natural
and proximate consequences of a wrongful act, and it is undoubtedly true that the plaintiff in such a case may recover for defamatory words spoken of him or her by the defendant, even though the
words are not in' themselves actionable, if the declaration sets forth
such a claim in due form and the allegation is sustained by sufficient
evidence, but the claim must be specifically set forth in order that
the defendant may be duly notified of its nature and that the court
may have the means to determine whether the alleged special damage is the natural and proximate consequences of the defamatory
words alleged to have been spoken by the defendant: ifaddan v.
Scott, 15 C. B. 429.
Wheneve r .proof of special damage is necessary to maintain an
action of slander the claim for the same must be set forth in the
declaration, and it must appear that the special damage is the
natural and proximate consequence of the words spoken, else the
allegation will not entitle the plaintiff to recover, Vicars v. Wilcox,
8 East 3 ; Knight v. aibbs, 1 Ad. & Ell. 46 ; Ayre v. Craven, 2
Ad. & Ell. 8; Boberts v. Roberts, 5 Best & Smith 389.
When special damage is claimed, to support such an action for
words not in themselves actionable, the nature of the special loss
or injury must be particularly set forth, and if it is not, the defendant may demur. He did demur in the case last cited, and
COCKBURN, C. J., remarked that such an action is not maintainable, unless it be shown that the loss of some substantial or material
advantage has resulted from the speaking of the words: Addison
on Torts, 3d ed. 805; Wilby v. -Elston, 8 C. B. 148.
Where the words are not in themselves actionable, because the
offence imputed involves neither moral turpitude, nor subjects the
offender to an infamous punishment, special damage must be
alleged and proved in order to maintain the action : .loag v. Hatch,
23 Conn. 590; Andres v. Koppenheafer, 3 S. & R. 256; Buys
v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. 117.
In such a case it is necessary that the declaration should set
forth precisely in what way the special damage resulted from the
speaking of the words. It is not sufficient to allege generally,
that the plaintiff has suffered special damages or that the party

